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ABSTRACT 1 
Punishing group members who parasitize their own group’s 2 
resources is an almost universal human behavior, as evidenced by 3 
multiple cross-cultural and theoretical studies. Recently, researchers in 4 
social and behavioral sciences have identified a puzzling phenomenon 5 
called “antisocial punishment”: some people are willing to pay a cost to 6 
“punish” those who act in ways that benefit their shared social group. 7 
Interestingly, the expression of antisocial punishment behavior is 8 
regionally diverse and linked to the socio-psychological dimensions of 9 
local cultural values. In this review, we adopt an ecological perspective 10 
to examine why antisocial punishment might be an advantageous strategy 11 
for individuals in some socio-economic contexts. Drawing from research 12 
in behavioral economics, personality, social psychology and 13 
anthropology, we discuss the proximate mechanisms of antisocial 14 
punishment operating at an individual level, and their consequences at 15 
the group and cultural levels. We also consider the evolutionary 16 
dynamics of antisocial punishment investigated with computer 17 
simulations. We argue that antisocial punishment is an expression of 18 
aggression, and is driven by competition for status. Our review elucidates 19 
the possible socio-ecological underpinnings of antisocial punishment, 20 
which may have widespread repercussions at a cultural level. 21 
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Homo homini lupus? Explaining antisocial punishment 22 
 “It is not surprising that there should be a struggle in man 23 
between his social instincts, with their derived virtues, and his lower, 24 
though at the moment, stronger impulses or desires.” (Darwin, 1871, 25 
p.104) 26 
Recent reports on antisocial punishment have drawn attention to 27 
the duality of human nature. Antisocial punishment can be defined as 28 
paying a cost to reduce the resources of a person whose previous 29 
cooperative behavior benefited the punisher and their group. In past 30 
research, the focus tended to be on altruistic punishment – paying a cost 31 
to reduce the resources of a person who previously exploited group 32 
resources. Altruistic punishment has become an area of particular interest 33 
because it offers a potential resolution of the quest to understand human 34 
cooperation. Extensive cooperation in humans, often considered 35 
surprising in light of Darwinian natural selection theory, has been 36 
investigated in numerous empirical and theoretical studies (e.g. Gintis, 37 
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2005; Henrich et al., 2004). Altruistic 38 
punishment, despite its negative proximate motives1 and, sometimes, 39 
detrimental effect on average payoffs,2 has been proposed as a form of 40 
                                                
1 Rather than turning the other cheek and continuing to cooperate, motivated 
by anger humans use punishment towards selfish individuals (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  
2 (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008; Wu et al., 2009) 
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pro-social behavior promoting cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 41 
Moreover, it inspired a new theory of the evolution of human cooperation 42 
- strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 2000). However, 43 
more recent investigations of the full range of available and expressed 44 
punishment behavior across cultures have highlighted the existence of 45 
antisocial punishment.  This has led some to reconsider the “dark side” of 46 
human behavior, including a tendency for spite and hyper-47 
competitiveness (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009; 48 
Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008; Jensen, 2010). 49 
Our review is motivated by the unexplained cultural variation in 50 
antisocial punishment revealed by Herrmann et al. (2008). We propose 51 
that the high levels of punishment directed toward cooperators in places 52 
like Muscat, Athens and Riyadh reflect different pressures in these socio-53 
economic or cultural environments. These pressures affect the perception 54 
of group identity, which leads to changes in individual behavior. We 55 
argue that, despite lowering absolute levels of resources across a society 56 
taken in aggregate, antisocial punishment may constitute a successful 57 
individual strategy for establishing social status and receiving its 58 
benefits. This ecological interpretation of costly punishment allows us to 59 
present it devoid of ethical loading and enables a better understanding of 60 
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its functional causes.3 In addition to proposing and justifying this 61 
theoretical framework, we also emphasize some unresolved questions 62 
about costly punishment, and offer testable predictions. 63 
The review is organized as follows. We first focus on the various 64 
definitions of costly punishment and how they relate to the concept of 65 
altruism in different disciplines. Next, we discuss how methodological 66 
manipulations of the cost-to-impact ratios of costly punishment affect its 67 
use. We observe that the amount of costly punishment meted out to 68 
others (in particular, antisocial punishment) is rationally adjusted to 69 
exploit its effect of increasing the positive difference between one’s own 70 
and others’ payoffs. In the proceeding sections we discuss antisocial 71 
punishment at three levels: cultural, group and individual. At each level, 72 
we show how antisocial punishment could bring advantages despite its 73 
initial cost. Crucially, the benefits from using antisocial punishment may 74 
result from punishers acquiring a higher status within their groups. In the 75 
last section, we present the evolutionary perspective on antisocial 76 
punishment and its ultimate consequences for a population, as well as, for 77 
individuals.  78 
                                                
3 Reproductive timing in human females viewed from an ecological 
perspective is a notable example of how socially undesirable behaviour, such as teenage 
pregnancies, can be neutrally explained and considered a biologically sensible strategy. 
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In this review, to fully understand antisocial punishment, we 79 
consider both its proximate and ultimate causes (Scott-Phillips, Dickins, 80 
& West, 2011). A proximate explanation refers to the mechanism that 81 
leads an individual to express a behavior, while an ultimate one describes 82 
the evolutionary context that resulted in the appearance of (normally, 83 
selection for) a behavior or trait.  While many authors have shown that 84 
this distinction can be difficult to make (Scott-Phillips et al., 2011; 85 
Thierry, 2005), drawing it allows us to investigate two complimentary 86 
explanations for why antisocial punishment occurs. First, we focus on the 87 
workings of antisocial punishment – the proximate mechanisms that 88 
drive it; then, we discuss why it might have evolved – the evolutionary 89 
dynamics might have caused it. The answer to the former question is 90 
provided primarily by experiments using behavioral economics games 91 
while the answer to the latter one comes from computer simulations of 92 
evolutionary processes.  93 
Costly punishment terminology 94 
Economists, psychologists and biologists often use the same 95 
phrases to mean different things. When drawing together knowledge 96 
from various disciplines, it is important to precisely determine what is 97 
understood by terms such as altruistic or antisocial punishment in each, 98 
and to define the specific usage in the present discussion. Our use of the 99 
word punishment originates within the context of behavioral economics 100 
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experiments, in which researchers typically employ the Public Goods 101 
Game (PGG) with punishment, the Ultimatum Game (UG) and/or the 102 
Third Party Punishment game (TPP). PGGs can be played one-shot or for 103 
multiple rounds (for the implications which follow from this difference, 104 
see Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). They can also be played with or without 105 
punishment opportunities. If a sequence of PGGs is played, the player’s 106 
group membership can be maintained or different participants may be 107 
grouped together in each round. In the latter case, any consequences of 108 
punishment do not affect the punisher. UGs and TPPs are, typically, only 109 
played for a single round. 110 
PGGs represent a social dilemma because the individual’s 111 
interests are in conflict with the group’s interests. In PGGs, a group of 112 
individuals can contribute some portion of their allocation to the public 113 
pool, which benefits everyone equally. Individuals who do not contribute 114 
anything, or contribute less than others, gain a payoff advantage. In 115 
PGGs with punishment, after a round of the PGG, individuals can 116 
anonymously punish others (usually at a cost-to-impact ratio of 1/3). In 117 
UGs, one individual (the proposer) can share an amount of money 118 
between themselves and a recipient. After the proposer’s offer, the 119 
recipient decides whether they accept it, in which case both parties 120 
receive the respective amounts. Alternatively, the recipient can reject the 121 
offer, in which case no one receives anything. The act of rejection 122 
represents the act of costly punishment because both the recipient and the 123 
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proposer suffer a cost. TPPs greatly resemble UGs, with the major 124 
difference being that the recipient in the TPP is passive and cannot 125 
punish. Instead, an extra third person, not benefitting from the split, has 126 
an opportunity to spend money on punishing the proposer.   127 
In an experimental setting, people mete out costly punishment 128 
towards uncooperative individuals, even when there is no opportunity to 129 
interact with them again (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Such punishment has 130 
been dubbed “altruistic” because the punisher decides to pay a fee to 131 
reduce the payoff of free-riders, and this action is likely to make free-132 
riders increase their cooperative contributions in future interactions.4 133 
Hence, in congruence with the biological definition of altruism (West, 134 
Griffin, & Gardner, 2007), punishment is costly to the actor and 135 
beneficial to the recipient, where the recipients are individuals interacting 136 
with the punished person in the future. The biological definition of 137 
altruism refers to the lifetime fitness consequences of a behavior, which 138 
                                                
4 Fehr and Gächter’s definition of altruistic punishment is encapsulated in the 
following two quotes: “Punishment may well benefit the future group members of a 
punished subject, if that subject responds to the punishment by raising investments in 
the following periods. In this sense, punishment is altruistic.” (p.137, Fehr & Gächter, 
2002). “Thus, the act of punishment, although costly for the punisher, provides a benefit 
to other members of the population by inducing potential non-cooperators to increase 
their investments. For this reason, the act of punishment is an altruistic act.” (p.139, 
Fehr & Gächter, 2002).	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are impossible to capture in behavioral economics experiments. For the 139 
sake of convenience, we adopt Fehr and Gächter’s term  “altruistic 140 
punishment” to describe a phenomenon occurring in short-term 141 
experimental interactions, although we acknowledge that this definition 142 
might be misleading (see Sylwester, Mitchell, & Bryson, submitted). 143 
Altruistic punishment requires that (a) punishers suffer a cost for 144 
punishing and (b) punished individuals are thereby induced to become 145 
more pro-social. Hence, in behavioral economics, the term “altruistic 146 
punishment” is defined through the negative economic outcomes to the 147 
punisher and positive economic outcomes to the group. When 148 
psychological drives are considered, altruistic punishment seems to be 149 
motivated  not by the altruistic desire to help the group but rather by 150 
negative feelings towards cheaters and the willingness to harm them 151 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002). It could be argued that these negative emotions 152 
are a consequence of egalitarian preferences and that the underlying 153 
psychological motivation is, therefore, altruistic (Cinyabuguma, Page, & 154 
Putterman, 2006; Denant-Boemont, Masclet, & Noussair, 2007; 155 
Nikiforakis, 2008). However, studies investigating egalitarian 156 
preferences typically use games that measure the degree to which people 157 
are willing to reduce others’ income, rather than their own income. A 158 
reduction of others’ income is as likely a result of competitive 159 
preferences as egalitarian ones. Therefore, it is questionable whether 160 
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punishment behavior should ever be considered “altruistic”, in the folk-161 
psychological sense.  162 
 Researchers working on costly punishment noticed that in 163 
behavioral economics experiments some punishment is directed not to 164 
free-riders but to cooperators instead (the earliest record of this 165 
phenomenon is provided by Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). This 166 
punishment type has been dubbed, antisocial (Herrmann et al., 2008), 167 
spiteful (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005) or perverse (Cinyabuguma et 168 
al., 2006). Antisocial punishment, the “sanctioning of people who behave 169 
prosocially” (p.1362, Herrmann et al., 2008), is defined in a broader 170 
manner than altruistic punishment (see Table 1). Both altruistic and 171 
antisocial punishment are costly to the punisher and even more so to the 172 
punished, but the definition of antisocial punishment makes no reference 173 
to the consequence of such punishment to group cooperation and welfare.  174 
Rather, antisocial punishment focuses on the punishment’s target: it is the 175 
punishment of those who give more than the punisher.  176 
Hermann et al. (2008) found a statistically significant negative 177 
correlation between antisocial punishment and cooperative contributions 178 
measured across all subject pools. However, as shown in Table 1, 179 
antisocial punishment can sometimes be functionally neutral or even 180 
altruistic, in the sense that punishing an individual with a higher 181 
cooperative contribution can prevent this person from reducing the level 182 
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of their contributions or even encourage them to contribute more5. Such 183 
an effect can be enhanced by the fact that, in PGG, punished individuals 184 
typically do not know who punished them. As a result, they may suspect 185 
that the punishment came from a cooperator and hence is deserved. This 186 
thread of reasoning finds support in Herrmann et al.’s (2008) data. In 12 187 
out of 16 participant pools, receiving antisocial punishment did not 188 
correlate negatively with contributions in the following rounds.6 189 
In this review, we will stick to the terms “altruistic” and 190 
“antisocial” punishment because, although imprecise and ethically 191 
loaded, they are well established in the literature. In our opinion, the 192 
evidence suggesting the psychologically- or biologically-altruistic 193 
character of punishment is weak. In the experimental setting, the 194 
altruistic nature of punishment can be identified only when repeated 195 
PGGs are played with different participants in each round, or in one-shot 196 
TTPs, but even then it is possible to find selfish explanations for 197 
punishment, for example spite. Moreover, punishment of free-riders, 198 
instead of positively affecting future contributions, may actually decrease 199 
                                                
5 Such an effect has been noticed by Herrmann et al. (p.1366, 2008): “Some 
antisocial punishment can be efficiency-enhancing in intent to induce the punished 
individual to increase his or her contributions.” 
6 See Table S7B in Herrmann et al.’s (2008) supplementary material. Cities 
where participants decreased cooperation after being a victim of antisocial punishment: 
Bonn, Minsk, Samara and Istanbul. 
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them (Sylwester, Mitchell & Bryson, submitted). Therefore, in this 200 
review we will use altruistic to denote any punishment meted out by 201 
cooperators to free-riders. Depending on the study, cooperators are either 202 
defined with respect to individual cooperativeness (those who contribute 203 
more than, or equally to, another individual are cooperators, while those 204 
who contribute less are free-riders) or to average group contributions 205 
(those who contribute more than, or equal to, the group mean are 206 
cooperators, those who contribute less are free-riders). Antisocial will be 207 
used as it was defined by Herrmann et al. (2008). Therefore, any 208 
punishment imposed by free-riders on cooperators, or individuals of 209 
equal contributions, will be referred to as antisocial. 210 
1. The price of punishment 211 
Researchers investigating costly punishment typically assume that 212 
punishment is more costly to the punisher than to the punished. Due to 213 
convention rather than any particular rationale, the most commonly used 214 
cost-to-impact ratio is 1:3; it costs the punisher one point to reduce the 215 
payoff of the punished individual by three points. Although costly 216 
punishment can be considered irrational from the perspective of 217 
maximizing the absolute payoff, it does follow a rational rule when 218 
relative payoff is prioritized. 219 
Expenditure on punishment is strongly affected by the cost-to-220 
impact ratio. The general finding is that the use of punishment decreases 221 
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as the punishment price increases (e.g. Anderson & Putterman, 2006). 222 
Despite this, some costly punishment (mostly directed at uncooperative 223 
individuals) is observed even when the cost to the punisher is larger than 224 
the cost to the punished individual. Antisocial punishment does occur, 225 
though rarely, even with a high relative cost of punishment (Anderson & 226 
Putterman, 2006).7  227 
There is variation in the results reported concerning sensitivity to 228 
the relative cost of punishment. Using data from U.S. participants, 229 
Carpenter (2007) analyzed the behavior of free-riders who punished 230 
cooperators, cooperators who punished free-riders and free-riders who 231 
punished other free-riders.8 Out of the three groups, free-riders punishing 232 
other free-riders were most sensitive to the price of punishment. Free-233 
riders who punished cooperators did not condition their punishment 234 
decisions on price. Carpenter’s results contrast with those obtained by 235 
Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher who used a sample of Swiss participants 236 
(2005). These researchers found that when the cost of punishment is the 237 
same to the punisher as to the punished, antisocial punishment 238 
                                                
7 In Anderson and Putterman’s  (2006) study there were three price-to-impact 
conditions with ratios in condition 1: 0/100, 30/100, 60/100, 80/100, 120/100, condition 
2: 0/100, 5/100, 10/100, 20/100, 30/100 and condition 3: 30/100, 40/100, 50/100, 
60/100, 70/100. 
8 Free-riding was defined as a negative deviation from the group average. 
Punishment price-to-impact ratios were as follows:1/4, 1/2, 1/1, 2/1, 4/1. 
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disappears.9 When punishment resulted in lowering the payoff of the 239 
punished person to a greater extent than reducing the cost to the punisher, 240 
sanctioning of cooperators by defectors and defectors by other defectors 241 
occurred frequently.   242 
Egas and Riedl (2008) varied the cost and the impact of 243 
punishment and investigated how such a manipulation affected 244 
cooperation and punishment decisions in repeated PGGs played by Dutch 245 
speakers from around the world.10 As in Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher’s 246 
study, cooperative individuals were willing to punish when the cost to the 247 
punisher was equal to, and even when it exceeded the cost to the 248 
punished, though in such cases cooperation was not maintained. Unlike 249 
in Falk et al.’s study, Egas and Riedl observed antisocial punishment of 250 
more cooperative individuals in all cost-to-impact conditions.11 In 251 
agreement with Falk et al.’s results, antisocial punishment was highest 252 
when its cost was relatively low in comparison with the impact on the 253 
punished (28% of all punishment acts). However, it remained at the level 254 
of 22.3% and 18.5% in the two conditions where the cost to the punisher 255 
                                                
9 In their study there were two price conditions: a low-sanction condition with 
a price-to-impact ratio of 1/1 and a high-sanction condition in which the price-to-impact 
ratio of punishing cooperators was 1/3.33 while punishing defectors was 1/2.5. 
10 The price-to-impact ratios used by Egas and Riedl were: 1/3, 3/1, 1/1 and 
3/3 
11 The researchers call this counter-intuitive punishment. 
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was equal to the impact on the punished. Surprisingly, even when the 256 
punishing cost exceeded its impact by three times, antisocial punishment 257 
was still present (13% of all punishment acts).  258 
What happens when punishers themselves can decide about the 259 
cost-to-impact ratio of their punishment? Theories of inequality aversion 260 
(e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) suggest that the punisher should use a ratio 261 
that would result in minimizing the payoff difference between themselves 262 
and the punished. However, if punishment is motivated by the desire for 263 
revenge, competition or the pursuit of social status, punishers should 264 
adjust the ratio in a way to create an inequality favorable to them. A 265 
critical test of these predictions was conducted using the Dictator game 266 
with punishment, in which recipients were allowed to decide how much 267 
money they wished to deduct from the dictator’s account and where the 268 
cost of punishment to the punisher was always $1. Two-thirds of the 269 
resultant punishments were inequality-seeking. That is, the punisher 270 
decided to deduct from the Dictator more money than was necessary to 271 
maintain equality.  One-third did deduct only the amount of money 272 
necessary to reach equality or less (Houser & Xiao, 2010). 273 
Researchers have tended to focus on costly punishment where 274 
both the punisher and the punished suffer a cost. It is possible to imagine 275 
that non-monetary punishment, in the form of a reprimand that does not 276 
affect either the punisher’s or the punished’s payoff, has some effect on 277 
cooperation. Indeed, both costly and non-monetary punishment were 278 
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found to increase cooperation, but the effect of non-monetary sanctions 279 
weakened over time (Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003). As in 280 
other studies on costly punishment, monetary sanctioning was predicted 281 
by both negative and positive deviation from the punisher’s cooperation 282 
level, indicating the presence of altruistic and antisocial punishment. 283 
However, in the condition where non-monetary sanctions were used, 284 
while the effect of altruistic punishment persisted, antisocial punishment 285 
was absent. Masclet et al.’s (2003) study is important in that it gives 286 
insight into the motivations behind antisocial punishment. The fact that 287 
non-monetary reprimands were not used to punish antisocially indicates 288 
that the reason for using antisocial punishment is not to change other 289 
individuals’ future economic behavior but to negatively affect their 290 
payoffs.  291 
The presented evidence does not allow for an unequivocal 292 
conclusion about how the cost-to-impact ratio of punishment affects 293 
antisocial punishment. While some studies show that changing the cost-294 
to-impact ratio affects antisocial punishment to a greater extent than 295 
altruistic punishment and that antisocial punishment is more likely to be 296 
reduced when the ratio is unfavorable to the punisher, others do not 297 
report such an effect. Despite the mixed findings reported in the studies, 298 
it appears that antisocial, rather than altruistic, punishment is more 299 
sensitive to the manipulations of the cost-to-impact ratio. In line with this 300 
conclusion is the fact that sanctioning cooperators does not occur when 301 
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their payoffs cannot be altered.  Moreover, free-riders who are potential 302 
antisocial punishers are less willing to buy costly information about 303 
other’s contributions than more cooperative individuals who become 304 
altruistic punishers (Page, Putterman, & Garcia, 2008). This suggests that 305 
some instances of costly punishment, in particular antisocial punishment, 306 
may function as aggressive acts, and are not contingent on the previous 307 
cooperative behavior of the punished individuals. In sum, in apparently 308 
irrational costly antisocial behavior, the decisions to punish are, at least 309 
in some studies, logically tied to the effectiveness of such punishment 310 
and to the ability to increase the positive difference between others’ 311 
payoffs and one’s own.  312 
Cross-cultural variation in punishment 313 
A human sense of fairness is omnipresent but takes on different 314 
forms around the world (Henrich et al., 2005). A cross-cultural analysis 315 
of punishment in UGs and of TTP games revealed a consistent trend; as 316 
the offered amount approached an equal split, recipients in the UG and 317 
observers in TTP were less willing to punish (Henrich et al., 2006). 318 
Interestingly, in some societies a small fraction of recipients sanctioned 319 
those whose offers were hyper-fair i.e. those who donated more than an 320 
equal split would predict. The suggested reason for such behavior, 321 
observed mostly in gift-giving cultures, was the reluctance of recipients 322 
to feel indebted to the proposers and the subordinate position resulting 323 
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from such a debt. In consequence, cooperators were punished 324 
antisocially, but, interestingly, in this situation the cost to the punisher 325 
was even higher than the cost to the punished.12 326 
Punishing generous individuals appeared as a leitmotiv in 327 
Herrmann et al.’s (2008) cross-cultural study on costly punishment, 328 
conducted in 16 comparable subject pools. Participants from different 329 
cities across the world played multi-round PGGs, with each round 330 
followed by a punishment opportunity. Herrmann et al. (2008) found that 331 
the level of antisocial punishment, measured as punishment towards 332 
individuals whose PGG contributions were equal to or exceeded the 333 
punisher’s contributions, varied dramatically across societies. Notably, 334 
high levels of antisocial punishment were observed in Greece, Turkey, 335 
the former Soviet Union and the Middle East while lower levels were 336 
found in the U.S, Australia, the Far East and Northwestern Europe13. 337 
Previous experiments, conducted in places with low levels of antisocial 338 
punishment, showed that the opportunity to punish positively affected 339 
group cooperation. However, not surprisingly, in subject pools where 340 
                                                
12 In splits where the proposer offers more than a fair share to the recipient 
(e.g. 30 for the proposer and 70 for the recipient), a recipient who rejects the offer 
suffers a higher cost (70) than the “punished” proposer (30). 
13 Scandinavia, the UK, Germany & Switzerland. Southwestern Europe, e.g. 
France, Spain & Italy were not tested. 
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cooperators were punished heavily, cooperation levels did not increase 341 
with punishment.  342 
In an attempt to explain the observed cross-cultural variation, 343 
Herrmann et al. investigated possible relationships between antisocial 344 
punishment and a number of socio-demographic factors. Democracy 345 
ranking and a measure of the prosperity of a country (GDP per capita) 346 
were negatively correlated with antisocial punishment, suggesting that 347 
high socio-economic development coincides with the cooperation-348 
enhancing function of punishment. Antisocial punishment was also 349 
related to various cultural dimensions of the investigated countries (see 350 
Hofstede, 2001) e.g. it occurred more often in places where the inequality 351 
in society was high (high Power Distance), where ties between 352 
individuals and their in-group are strong (low Individualism), where 353 
gender differences tend to fade away (low Masculinity) and where 354 
uncertainty avoidance is high.  355 
In their analysis, Herrmann at al. (2008) emphasized two factors 356 
as possible explanations for the cross-cultural variation in antisocial 357 
punishment: the norms of civic cooperation and the rule of law. The 358 
norms of civic cooperation is a measure based on questions used in the 359 
World Values Survey describing the strength of abiding cooperative 360 
norms in a society and the level of disapproval for breaking them. The 361 
rule of law is an indicator developed by the World Bank to describe the 362 
extent to which people perceive their government, police, courts and 363 
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authorities as fair, trustworthy and effective at law enforcement. Both 364 
measures were negatively correlated with antisocial punishment. 365 
Additionally, the researchers investigated a link between Inglehart’s cultural 366 
dimensions “traditional vs. secular-rational values” and “survival vs. self-367 
expression values” and antisocial punishment. They found less antisocial 368 
punishment in cities where self-expression values i.e. social liberties and 369 
personal freedom mattered more than survival values, which represent 370 
economic and physical security.14	  371 
With so many interdependent predictors of antisocial punishment, 372 
it is difficult to determine their relative importance and assess their 373 
explanatory power. While Herrmann et al. focused on predictors 374 
involving ethical evaluation of certain behaviors by the society (norms of 375 
civic cooperation); and the quality, efficiency and fairness of a 376 
centralized sanctioning system within a society (rule of law), it is 377 
possible to imagine that differences in antisocial punishment are driven 378 
by other societal characteristics. For example, if antisocial punishment is 379 
proximately motivated by dominance and the desire for social control, it 380 
would be reasonable to focus on its relationship with power distance and 381 
survival/self-expression values. High levels of antisocial punishment 382 
would be expected in places where social hierarchy and demonstration of 383 
                                                
14 This correlation is unsurprising given that Inglehart’s “survival vs. self-
expression values” are related to Hofstede’s power distance and Individualism-
Collectivism dimensions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
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power play an important role, and in harsher environments where 384 
individuals need to focus on local competition with their neighbors in 385 
order to succeed.  386 
The variation in cooperation observed in Herrmann et al.’s (2008) 387 
data was affected by individual heterogeneity and group-level differences 388 
and most importantly by the membership in a “world culture” (Gächter, 389 
Herrmann, & Thöni, 2010).15 Apart from the cultural differences in the 390 
average cooperation level when punishment was possible, there were also 391 
some interesting differences in the patterns of reacting to punishment. In 392 
subject pools with high levels of antisocial punishment, the level of 393 
cooperation remained low but relatively stable. In contrast, in places 394 
where punishment of free-riders dominated and antisocial punishment 395 
was scant, some participants, when the opportunity to punish was 396 
introduced, almost immediately increased their pro-social contributions 397 
(e.g. Boston, Nottingham, Copenhagen, Bonn, Zurich and St Gallen). In 398 
other subject pools the increase in cooperation occurred gradually over 399 
the course of rounds (e.g. Seoul, Chengdu and Melbourne). In general, 400 
clustering the subject pools according to the Inglehart and Baker (2000) 401 
schema did approximate the patterns of the reactions to punishment but 402 
                                                
15 World cultures have been defined following Inglehart and Baker (2000) and 
Hofstede (2001) as a way to capture their historical and cultural backgrounds.  
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there were exceptions. Melbourne, categorized as an English speaking 403 
culture, together with Nottingham, displayed a pattern similar to those 404 
observed in the cities of the Confucian culture-type. Boston, on the other 405 
hand, resembled the pattern observed in protestant non-English speaking 406 
Europe. 407 
Running identical experiments with the same experimenter and 408 
instructions allows us to unravel cross-cultural variation in antisocial-409 
punishment behavior. By employing a slightly different design, and 410 
comparing the behavior in subject pools from two countries, we may 411 
illuminate other cross-cultural patterns, not visible using the earlier 412 
experimental method. While costly punishment increases cooperation in 413 
Boston (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008), it does not do so in 414 
Beijing (Wu et al., 2009). In contrast, Herrmann et al. (2008) found that 415 
the opportunity to use punishment positively affected contributions in 416 
both subject pools, and that both Chinese participants from Chengdu and 417 
US participants from Boston exhibited similar levels of costly 418 
punishment, with only marginally higher level of antisocial punishment 419 
in China. Unlike in Hermann et al.’s paradigm with a PGG, in Dreber et 420 
al.’s and Wu et al.’s experiments participants had an opportunity to 421 
cooperate, defect or punish within a dyad, in each round. Wu et al. (2009) 422 
discovered high levels of indiscriminate punishing in China in 423 
comparison to the US. The researchers explained the differences between 424 
theirs and Herrmann et al.’s study by the differences between protocols 425 
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used. In the repeated PGG, Chinese participants might have recognized 426 
the concept of reputation, so important in their culture, whereas in the 427 
dyadic encounters this concept was not applicable. 428 
Another cross-cultural study, conducted by Gächter and 429 
Herrmann (2009), supported their 2008 results. In an experiment 430 
comparing antisocial punishment in Swiss and Russian participants, it 431 
was confirmed that the punishment directed at cooperators in one-shot 432 
games meted out by Russian participants was higher than antisocial 433 
punishment in Switzerland.16 What merits attention is that participants in 434 
both investigated regions could accurately predict the levels of antisocial 435 
punishment, which suggests that common cultural origins predispose 436 
people to correctly assess the cooperative and uncooperative intentions of 437 
the members of their cultural group. In Russia, participants exhibited 438 
more exploitative behavior in the sense that, even if they expected high 439 
levels of cooperation from others, their own cooperative contribution was 440 
lower than Swiss participants’ contributions. Introducing punishment had 441 
a positive effect on cooperation in Switzerland but a detrimental effect on 442 
cooperation in Russia. In the latter case, this effect was mostly driven by 443 
the change in the behavior of top contributors, who, presumably 444 
expecting antisocial punishment, became less cooperative. 445 
                                                
16 The reference level was the group average. 
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Evidence that an opportunity to punish produces different types of 446 
behavior in different cultures is growing. In a recent study, American and 447 
Romanian students showed a similar level of cooperative behavior when 448 
it was measured by games without punishment (Ellingsen et al., 2012). 449 
However, in repeated PGGs with punishment, American students tended 450 
to use cooperation-enhancing altruistic punishment, while Romanian 451 
students frequently meted out antisocial punishment. Interestingly, 452 
Romanian students often used indiscriminate punishment targeting both 453 
cooperators and non-cooperators. This finding is in line with our re-454 
analysis of Herrmann et al.’s dataset (Sylwester, Mitchell & Bryson, in 455 
preparation), showing a non-exclusive use of antisocial and altruistic 456 
punishment.  457 
It is plausible to expect that, within a given culture, socio-458 
demographic factors will modulate the occurrence of antisocial 459 
punishment, as they do with cooperation and third-party punishment 460 
(Marlowe et al., 2011). In a study conducted in rural and urban Russia, 461 
socio-demographic variables were found to affect cooperative but not 462 
punishing behavior (Gächter & Herrmann, 2011). High levels of 463 
antisocial punishment were unrelated to the age group and region of the 464 
sample but, surprisingly, participants with a university degree and those 465 
who were members of a voluntary organization exhibited higher levels of 466 
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antisocial punishment.17 It is important to note, however, that one-shot 467 
games were used in that experiment and different patterns might be 468 
revealed if participants are allowed to interact in the same group for a 469 
longer period of time, as in Herrmann et al. (2008). 470 
So far, the evidence gathered by Herrmann et al. (2008) provides 471 
the most complete picture of antisocial punishment in different cultures. 472 
The patchwork of other studies that differ in methodology do not 473 
facilitate a coherent theory of the driving forces behind the variation in 474 
antisocial punishment. The direction of the correlations between 475 
antisocial punishment and different socio-economic factors suggests that 476 
certain conditions can contribute to its occurrence. More specifically, it 477 
appears that antisocial punishment frequently takes place in cultures 478 
where the potential cost of it is low in relation to its benefits, for 479 
example, in places where norms are frequently infringed, free-riding is 480 
commonly approved of and legal sanctioning institutions are not 481 
perceived as being fair or efficient. In such places, the potential cost of 482 
being caught red-handed when punishing cooperators is low in 483 
comparison to places where unethical behavior is strongly penalized and 484 
disapproved of by both members of the society and legal institutions. On 485 
the other hand, we observe antisocial punishment in places where there is 486 
                                                
17 Though voluntary organisations in the former Soviet Union might have a 
different character from voluntary organisations in established market economies. 
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a lot to be gained from acquiring a higher rank in the group (even at a 487 
cost of the absolute payoff) and where status and power may have a 488 
dramatic impact on the quality of life and survival.  In cultures with high 489 
power distance the benefits coming from having a dominant status are 490 
much higher than where power distance is low. In places abundant in 491 
resources and with low inequality, gaining power might bring smaller 492 
ecological benefits than in places where resources are low and 493 
competition is fierce. 494 
Antisocial punishment at the group level 495 
Variation in antisocial punishment occurs at various levels. 496 
Starting from the top, we can consider cultures (e.g. as defined by 497 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000), populations within a culture, groups within a 498 
population and individuals within a group. Micro-level behavior 499 
modulates macro-level, so examining individual drives and social 500 
influences within different environments may help explain variation in 501 
the cultural make-up. In this section, we discuss between- and within-502 
group competition that may be affecting the observed variation in 503 
antisocial punishment. Punishment can be imposed within one’s own 504 
close social group or it may be inflicted on individuals from another 505 
group. Since altruistic punishment enhances group welfare in the long 506 
run (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008) while antisocial punishment can 507 
be expected to decrease it, the use of these two types of punishment 508 
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towards in-group and out-group members should be contingent on the 509 
severity of inter- and intra-group competition. 510 
Inter-group competition 511 
The parochial preferences widely documented in humans 512 
manifest themselves in people favoring individuals from their own social 513 
group (Tajfel, 1970). In-group favoritism can occur in any situation 514 
where an individual has an option to positively or negatively affect 515 
another individual’s well-being. Hence, we should be able to observe 516 
selective use of altruistic and antisocial punishment towards in-group 517 
versus out-group members. Costly altruistic punishment might be a 518 
useful tool for enhancing a group’s cohesion and cooperation, 519 
particularly when it is done within one’s own social group and not 520 
inflicted on out-group members. In contrast, antisocial punishment, 521 
which is likely to result in reducing group cooperation and coordination, 522 
could be an effective way to gain competitive advantage over another 523 
group when inflicted on members of an out-group. This in-group out-524 
group reasoning might be underlying the observed variation in antisocial 525 
punishment. Excessive generosity displayed by some individuals can 526 
possibly be interpreted as a signal of dominance rather than cooperation. 527 
High status of these cooperative individuals distinguishes them form the 528 
rest of the group. In consequence, cooperators are not perceived as in-529 
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group members and fall victim of antisocial punishment.18 530 
When costly punishment is meted out within one’s own group, 531 
effective altruistic punishment and inhibited antisocial punishment will 532 
positively affect the collective payoffs of individuals as a group This, in 533 
turn, can increase the odds of one group gaining advantage over another 534 
in between-group competition.  Where between-group competition has 535 
significant consequences, being a relatively weak individual in a 536 
dominant group may be better than being a dominant individual in a 537 
subordinate group (Queller, 1994; Wilson, 2004). 538 
The same logic can be applied to a situation when individuals 539 
have an opportunity to punish members of an out-group. It is reasonable 540 
to expect that with a higher degree of between-group competition the use 541 
of antisocial punishment towards out-group members will increase. 542 
Directing antisocial punishment to out-group members may undermine 543 
the out-group’s cooperation or make the mechanism of norm 544 
enforcement through altruistic punishment less effective.  Either could 545 
increase the competitive status of the punisher’s own group. 546 
Indeed, experiments conducted in Papua New Guinea with two 547 
                                                
18 In a recent study, U.S participants voted to expel from the group not only 
the most selfish members, but also the ones who excessively contributed to the public 
good and used little of it (Parks & Stone, 2010). Social comparison mechanisms, 
combined with the unwillingness to adhere to high norms established by the over-
generous individuals, were proposed as explanations for this phenomenon. 
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distinct social groups revealed that altruistic punishment was highest 548 
when the person in charge of the split, the recipient and the punisher 549 
came from the same social group, and also when only the recipient and 550 
the punisher came from the same group (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 551 
2006). Most antisocial punishment was observed in the latter case, 552 
confirming that punishers were more likely to punish in a way that 553 
negatively affected payoffs of an out-group member. In another study 554 
with artificially created groups of Japanese participants, a similar pattern 555 
was observed (Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004).19 Punishing of 556 
free-riders by cooperators happened more frequently when done within 557 
one’s own group (this result was also obtained by McLeish & Oxoby, 558 
2007), but, interestingly, free-riders meted out harsher punishment on 559 
other free-riders from an out-group rather than in-group. In Shinada et 560 
al.’s (2004) study, antisocial punishment was minimal and no in-561 
group/out-group effects were reported.  Perhaps this is unsurprising, 562 
given Japan’s high GDP and the strong rule of law in that country.  563 
One-shot TPP experiments have also been conducted in India to 564 
investigate the impact of the different caste memberships on punishing 565 
behavior. While high-caste participants punished norm violators more 566 
severely than low-caste participants (Hoff, Kshetramade, & Fehr, 2009), 567 
                                                
19 The group distinction was created by telling participants that the other 
members either belonged to their own or a different academic unit. 
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the caste differences in the punishment of cooperators were not 568 
significant (Fehr, Hoff, & Kshetramade, 2008). Investigating spiteful 569 
behavior of low and high castes, using a series of binary choice Dictator 570 
games (in which one person decided about the split of a given amount of 571 
money), provided mixed results. When presented with a choice between 572 
70/90 (other/self) distribution and 90/90 distribution, 42% of high caste 573 
participants and only 21% of low cast participants chose the first 574 
(spiteful) option. In contrast, when deciding between 150/150 and 575 
100/160 distributions, 83% of high caste and only 53% of low caste 576 
participants chose the first (equal split) option (Fehr et al., 2008). In the 577 
seven possible choices, high caste participants preferred the spiteful 578 
distribution more than low caste participants in only one case (in which 579 
the p value was marginally significant). However, the researchers 580 
concluded that “high-caste subjects (compared to low-caste subjects) are 581 
considerably more likely to reduce others’ payoffs if behind, or to take 582 
other spiteful actions” (p.499, Fehr et al., 2008).  583 
Mere in-group/out-group categorization may not invoke hostility 584 
and antisocial sanctions. As argued above, what triggers inter-group 585 
conflict and aggression is the social level at which the most significant 586 
competition takes place. In a sample from Swiss army platoons, group-587 
membership per se did not affect the occurrence of antisocial punishment 588 
but resulted in more altruistic punishment when the victim of defection 589 
was in-group and the defector was out-group (Goette, Huffman, Meier, & 590 
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Sutter, 2010). However, when between-group competition was 591 
introduced, costly punishment was mostly imposed on cooperators and 592 
free-riders from the out-group. At the same time, in-group cooperation 593 
increased. This points to an important role inter-group competition plays 594 
in inducing antisocial punishment (and Schadenfreude, see Leach, 595 
Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). Competition with the out-group 596 
can also induce excessive and wasteful punishment of in-group members. 597 
Contests between groups resulted in above-rational expenditures on 598 
competition but also in high expenditures on within-group punishment of 599 
individuals whose financial engagement in the conflict was lower than 600 
the group’s average (Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, & Orzen, 2010). High 601 
expenditures on costly punishment in the presence of competition have 602 
also been found by Sääksvuori et al. (2011). 603 
The levels of antisocial punishment observed in conventional 604 
PGG experiments appear to be low when contrasted with the levels 605 
towards the out-group members induced by conflict. A possible 606 
interpretation of this would be that punishment in ordinary PGG is only a 607 
side-effect of mechanisms evolved for conflict situations. The act of 608 
costly punishment, when taken out of the PGG context, can be perceived 609 
as mere aggression. Engaging in aggressive interactions with out-group 610 
members in the presence of conflict may be advantageous, in that it may 611 
help preserve a group’s resources such as territory. Herrmann et al. 612 
(2008) found a negative correlation between antisocial punishment and 613 
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scores on the individualism/collectivism dimension. Antisocial 614 
punishment occurred more often in places where group identity plays a 615 
great role and where, in general, ethnocentrism and xenophobia are more 616 
pronounced. A possible explanation for this pattern might be that 617 
participants perceived other anonymous players as members of an out-618 
group rather than in-group.  619 
When extracted from the context of PGGs, costly punishment 620 
might be an effective weapon used in inter-group conflicts because the 621 
cost of aggression is smaller than its consequences to the opponent. 622 
Using altruistic punishment in conflict, although still effective at the 623 
individual level, might not work in the long term, because it may result in 624 
the out-group becoming more cooperative and coherent. Instead, 625 
antisocial punishment of out-group cooperators undermines the stability 626 
of the other group’s social norms.  627 
Intra-group competition 628 
In ecological contexts where intra-group competition is fierce, 629 
individuals will use aggression towards members of their own group. 630 
Costly punishment typically decreases average payoffs (Dreber et al., 631 
2008; Wu et al., 2009), however, it might be useful for displaying 632 
aggression and gaining relative advantage over the punished individual. 633 
Previous research has shown that people do care about their relative 634 
payoff within a group. For example, Saijo and Nakamura (1995) made 635 
participants face a non-dilemma in which the payoff maximizing choice 636 
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was to contribute the whole allocation to the public pool20. Although the 637 
contributions to PGG in the non-dilemma condition were higher than in 638 
the standard dilemma, a considerable number of participants still 639 
refrained from contributing and failed to maximize their payoff. The 640 
average amounts saved in the non-dilemma situation were higher than the 641 
average investments to the public pool in the traditional dilemma version 642 
of the PGG. This indicates that in the no-dilemma situation more 643 
participants chose the non-optimal (non-payoff-maximizing) outcome 644 
than in the traditional dilemma, indicating that the non-dilemma may 645 
have been taken as a spiteful dilemma. 646 
Saijo and Nakamura (1995) concluded that there exists a 647 
population of spiteful individuals who value their ranking within the 648 
group more than their absolute payoff. In a similar but more recent study, 649 
even when the payoff maximizing decision was to contribute everything 650 
to the public pool, a considerable number of participants did not do that 651 
(Kümmerli, Burton-Chellew, Ross-Gillespie, & West, 2010). The 652 
researchers described this phenomenon as “resistance to extreme 653 
strategies” or “imperfections” and discovered that a considerable number 654 
of participants perceived their group members as competitors rather than 655 
                                                
20 Saijo and Nakamura (1995) used two variants of the PGG marginal per 
capita return from each point invested: low return (standard PGG) where each invested 
point yields 0.7, and high return (anti-dilemma) where each invested point yields 1.43 
points. 
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full collaborators even when competition has been deliberately repressed 656 
by the experimental condition. Analogously, the reluctance to accept an 657 
unfair split in the UGs described earlier may be dictated not by the norm 658 
of fairness but by competitive preferences and/or simple heuristics 659 
(Binmore, 2007).  660 
Could this competitive tendency in humans be an artifact of lab 661 
experiments using specific homogenous samples (see Henrich, Heine, & 662 
Norenzayan, 2010)?  Recent studies revealed that “spiteful” punishment 663 
(measured as the rate of rejection of offers in the Ultimatum Game, UG) 664 
is as frequent in large-scale as in small-scale societies, while the 665 
occurrence of “altruistic” third-party punishment is mostly limited to the 666 
large-scale ones (Marlowe et al., 2008, 2011). Moreover, participants 667 
from the large societies tend to use more third-party punishment than 668 
spiteful second-party punishment. Marlowe et al. (2011) suggested that 669 
this distribution of the third- and second-party punishment points to the 670 
spiteful origins of human cooperation. An aversion to a personally-671 
unfavorable unequal split, regardless of whether it is caused by fairness 672 
concerns or spiteful preferences, appears to be a human universal (see 673 
also Price, 2005).  674 
If the long-term relationship between rank in a group and success as an 675 
individual is strong, then paying a small cost in order to acquire a higher 676 
rank by harming another individual may pay off in the long run. There 677 
are numerous examples in the animal world where the dominant 678 
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individual benefits disproportionately from being higher-ranked than the 679 
second-highest individual in the hierarchy. Reproductive skew – that is, 680 
the monopolizing of reproduction by alpha males and females – has been 681 
observed in many species (e.g. Nelson-Flower et al., 2011; Setchell, 682 
Charpentier, & Wickings, 2005; Sumner, Casiraghi, Foster, & Field, 683 
2002). Rank may be particularly important in smaller groups in which it 684 
is possible for one individual to control all potential competitors 685 
(Kutsukake & Nunn, 2006). 686 
In a situation where between-group competition is relatively low, the in-687 
group members become the main competitors for resources. In such 688 
circumstances, one should expect indiscriminate punishment because 689 
both altruistic and antisocial types of punishment increase the positive 690 
payoff difference between the punisher and the punished. By Sylwester et 691 
al.’s calculation (submitted), over 50% of participants from Muscat, 692 
Athens, Samara and Riyadh in the Herrmann et al.’s (2008) study used 693 
both antisocial and altruistic punishment over the course of ten rounds. 694 
Both types of punishment were sometimes used within the same round21.   695 
                                                
21 11% of all punishment opportunities in Muscat and 9% in 
Riyadh showed mixed strategies. This is despite the fact that only half of 
the participants in the groups of four were able to punish this way on any 
given round, since by our definitions the highest contributors could not 
punish antisocially, nor the lowest altruistically.  
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In the data gathered by Herrmann et al. (2008), there is a negative 696 
relationship between GDP per capita (the measure of prosperity in a 697 
country) and the amount of antisocial punishment. GDP per capita is also 698 
highly correlated with the rule of law, used by the researchers as the main 699 
explanatory variable for antisocial punishment. Both the rule of law and 700 
antisocial punishment are constructs created to describe peoples’ 701 
attitudes and behaviors. The correlation between the two is important but 702 
circular – it is difficult to infer causality. GDP per capita is 703 
interdependent with these characteristics but is also a measure describing 704 
the socio-ecology of a given place and defines its living conditions. A 705 
common finding in both biology and sociology is that as resources 706 
become scarcer, local competition between individuals increases 707 
(Briones, Montana, & Ezcurra, 1998; Grossman & Mendoza, 2003). In 708 
the context of enhanced local competition caused by waning resources, 709 
relative payoffs may matter more than absolute payoffs. In societies with 710 
high income-inequality and economic instability, the perceived risks 711 
caused by decreasing resource availability may maximize competitive 712 
predispositions and induce aggression towards in-group members. 713 
Individual variation in antisocial punishment  714 
Differences in punishment strategies also exist within groups 715 
from relatively homogenous populations. There are two possible 716 
explanations of individual variation in antisocial punishment in such 717 
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groups. Sanctioning cooperators could be a strategic behavior dependent 718 
on the immediate circumstances, or it could constitute a relatively stable 719 
part of an individual’s personality. These two possibilities are not 720 
exclusive – recent results indicate that both may be true.  721 
Negative reciprocity – responding to harmful behavior with harm 722 
(also known as revenge or retaliation) – is widespread in humans. 723 
Evidence from UGs shows that, across the world, people would rather 724 
give up their profits than allow their partner to take a disproportionately 725 
large share (Henrich et al., 2005). Similarly, in PGGs, people are willing 726 
to punish those who exploited them and, as a result, became better off 727 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In anther study, participants playing PGGs, who 728 
were kept aware of the running-total earnings of fellow players, 729 
contributed significantly less than those who knew both earnings and 730 
contributions. These, in turn, contributed less than participants knowing 731 
contributions only (Nikiforakis, 2010).  Further, punishment  increased 732 
dramatically when both earnings and contributions were known in 733 
comparison to the condition with known contributions only. Punishment 734 
was not greater when only earnings were known, but it was also not less 735 
(Nikiforakis, 2010). 736 
Proximately, negative reciprocity results from the neurological 737 
underpinnings of vengeance. Individuals who punish those who behave 738 
unfairly derive satisfaction through the activation of reward circuits in 739 
the brain (De Quervain et al., 2004). De Quervain et al. (2004) 740 
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implemented an experimental condition where the result of an unequal 741 
split was due to chance, rather than to an intentional decision of their 742 
partner. In this case, the majority of participants reported no desire to 743 
punish and only three out of 14 participants sanctioned their partners by a 744 
small amount. De Quervain et al.’s results may be indirectly applied to 745 
antisocial punishment considering that costly punishment of cooperators 746 
is, at least to some extent, motivated by revenge. 747 
Herrmann et al. (2008) suggested that retaliation might be a 748 
possible reason for antisocial punishment. In the majority of the 749 
investigated subject pools, the amount of the received punishment is 750 
positively related to the scale of antisocial punishment. However, the 751 
design typically used in behavioral economic experiments on costly 752 
punishment does not allow for pinpointing revenge. In a standard setting, 753 
punishment is anonymous and participants are unaware of who punished 754 
them (e.g. Egas & Riedl, 2008; Falk et al., 2005; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; 755 
Herrmann et al., 2008). They also cannot see how much punishment 756 
other individuals receive and, thusly, they cannot assess whether 757 
sanctioning affects their contributions. Unless the punished individual is 758 
the top contributor, they might expect that any punishment they receive is 759 
“deserved” and may have come from a more cooperative person. In any 760 
case, their revenge is blind: individuals can only try to guess who 761 
punished them in the preceding rounds. 762 
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A few studies have investigated the consequences of revealing the 763 
identity of punishers and adding the possibility of targeted revenge to the 764 
design. In some conditions of the experiments of Denant-Boemont et 765 
al.’s (2007), Nikiforakis’s (2008) and Cinyabuguma et al.’s (2006) after 766 
the first punishment stage participants were able to pay to reduce others’ 767 
payoffs for a second time. Depending on the study, participants were 768 
provided with different information about the punishment decisions of 769 
others. In Denant-Boemont et al.’s (2007) study participants were either 770 
told all details about punishment decisions and the identities of the 771 
punishers (full information condition), only who punished them and by 772 
how much (revenge only condition) or information about how other 773 
players were punished (no revenge condition). In the “no revenge” 774 
condition, despite the extra punishment stage, participants’ contributions 775 
remained stable and similar to those observed when no extra punishment 776 
opportunity was available. In contrast, when participants could target 777 
those who punished them in the past, in the “full” information and 778 
“revenge only” conditions another punishment stage resulted in a 779 
decrease in cooperation. While in the “no revenge condition”, the amount 780 
contributed to the PGG above group average negatively correlated with 781 
received punishment, this was not the case when individuals could target 782 
those who punished them (full information and revenge only conditions), 783 
suggesting the occurrence of antisocial punishment. 784 
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Nikiforakis (2008) adopted a design similar to Denant-Boemont 785 
et al.’s “revenge only” condition, in that participants could only punish 786 
those who had just punished them. Antisocial punishment levels were 787 
similar in the condition where counter-punishment was possible and in 788 
the control standard condition with one round of punishment. However, 789 
when counter-punishment was enabled, both altruistic punishment and 790 
cooperation declined dramatically. In the counter-punishment stage, 791 
those who were punished antisocially were more likely to counter-punish 792 
than those who were punished because of their low contributions. In 793 
Cinyabuguma et al.’s (2006) experiment, participants learned how much 794 
punishment was assigned to individuals who contributed above, below or 795 
equal to the average of group contributions without knowing which 796 
specific individuals were punished and by how much. Here, the addition 797 
of another punishment stage did not result in participants lowering their 798 
contributions. Neither did it lead to a significant increase in 799 
contributions. 800 
In all three studies, in conditions where participants could target 801 
those who punished them in the past, the extra punishment stage 802 
negatively affected contributions to the public good. In those cases, 803 
punishment following contributions was lower than in the control 804 
condition without the second punishment stage. Clearly, the fear of 805 
revenge, suppressed sanctioning behavior in the first punishment stage, 806 
which in turn reduced cooperation. However, in the second stage of 807 
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punishment, sanctioning occurred frequently and was directed to both 808 
those who had previously punished altruistically and antisocially. In 809 
conclusion, individuals who behave in an uncooperative way and are 810 
subsequently punished, when given a chance, tend to retaliate. A 811 
combination of anger and the lack of guilt were found to be the main 812 
emotional causes of such negative reciprocity (Hopfensitz & Reuben, 813 
2009).  814 
Blind revenge is likely to be the motivation of some of the 815 
punishment observed in Herrmann et al.’s study. However, instances of 816 
punishing cooperators, though rare, occurred even after the first round of 817 
the PGG (the first punishment opportunity), where negative reciprocity 818 
can be excluded as a possible motive. In several studies, negative social 819 
preferences have been examined in circumstances where no motive for 820 
punishment existed. When participants of an experiment conducted in the 821 
Netherlands could destroy the partner’s money without the fear of 822 
retaliation, they did so in 40% of decisions (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009). In 823 
another experiment with Ukrainian participants, the destruction rate more 824 
than doubled, from around 11% to 25%, when the cause of destruction 825 
was made obscure to the partner (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011). This 826 
suggests that the way in which experiments are framed, combined with 827 
enhanced anonymity, can have a dramatic impact on people’s behavior. 828 
The fact that cooperative behavior is often measured through experiments 829 
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that include an option to give, but not an option to take, may lead to 830 
biases in the interpretation of results.  831 
Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) speculated that reducing another 832 
person’s income even at one’s own cost “gives pleasure”. Such an 833 
interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the known “warm glow” effect 834 
caused by helping others (Andreoni, 1995) and the finding that 835 
contributing to the public good activates reward areas in the brain 836 
(Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007), though there is known to be 837 
individual variation in the level of such social rewards (Nettle, 2006). 838 
How can we then explain the high levels of “nastiness” observed in 839 
Abbink and Sadrieh’s (2009) and Abbink and Herrmann’s (2011) 840 
studies? It might be that rather than being pleasant, high levels of 841 
harming behaviour have been caused by the action bias, a preference to 842 
perform a given action rather than not do anything (Baron & Ritov, 2004; 843 
Patt & Zeckhauser, 2000). High rates of negative social behaviour might 844 
simply be an experimental fluke caused by the absence of any positive 845 
alternative. In a study where both costly rewards and costly punishment 846 
could be used, costly punishment almost disappeared while rewarding 847 
others remained at a stable high level over the course of rounds (Rand, 848 
Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009).22  849 
                                                
22 Interestingly, in Rand et al.’s (2009) experiment conducted in the U.S., 
unlike in other studies, punishment and reward decisions were not anonymous, so 
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A propensity for antisocial punishment may constitute part of a 850 
person’s stable personality profile. In psychology, the Social Value 851 
Orientation (SVO) scale categorizes people with regard to how they 852 
value their personal payoff with reference to others’ payoffs. A common 853 
finding is that the majority of participants (on average 46%) have, what 854 
SVO calls a “pro-social” orientation i.e. they choose that they and the 855 
other individuals receive an equal payoff (Au & Kwong, 2004). A 856 
smaller proportion of individuals (38%) choose the selfish option that 857 
maximizes their own absolute payoff. There is also an even smaller 858 
group (12%) that the SVO labels as “competitive”. Competitive 859 
individuals favor a split that results in an increase in their own relative 860 
payoff, unlike selfish individuals who seek to maximize their absolute 861 
payoff.23 While SVO may offer a proximate reason for why some 862 
individuals express antisocial punishment, it does not address the 863 
                                                                                                                   
participants could target those who affected their payoffs in the past. Despite this 
possibility of revenge (discussed in detail earlier in this section), punishment patterns 
resembled those observed in experiments with an anonymous design. Only a small 
amount of antisocial punishment occurred (see Rand et al.’s supplementary material). 
Herrmann et al. (2008) also reported very low levels of antisocial punishment in their 
only American city. 
23 In the SVO scale it is not possible to choose a distribution in which the other 
individual’s payoff would be higher than own payoff.  
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evolutionary underpinnings of its distribution in a population.  We will 864 
return to this topic in the next section. 865 
Behavioral economics has also noted that social preferences are 866 
heterogeneous and that people can be classified into distinct types who 867 
behave in a relatively consistent and predictable manner (Fischbacher & 868 
Gächter, 2006; Gächter & Thöni, 2005; Kurzban & Houser, 2005). Their 869 
classification system is somewhat different than that adopted by social 870 
psychologists. The majority of individuals fall into the category called  871 
“conditional cooperators” or “reciprocators”, that is, they are social 872 
learners who react to others’ behavior. Due to their fine-tuning of 873 
behavior to free-riders’ lack of cooperation, contributions in PGG decline 874 
over time (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). The two smaller groups 875 
are made up of cooperators who consistently act in a way that increases 876 
group welfare and free-riders who consistently pursue their own payoff 877 
maximizing interest. 878 
The environment in which one develops may shape individual 879 
preferences for punishment behaviour. The choice of punishment type 880 
one imposes has been linked to the degree of discounting the future 881 
(Espin et al., 2012).  In this study, conducted in Spain, present-oriented 882 
participants meted out more antisocial punishment and less altruistic 883 
punishment than their future-oriented counterparts. Discounting the 884 
future and focusing on present competition may be a successful strategy 885 
in unpredictable environments with scarce resources. In contrast, 886 
EXPLAINING ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT  
 
 
 
45 
enforcing cooperation with an expectation of future benefits is likely to 887 
be a successful strategy in more stable and wealthy places (see Hill, 888 
Jenkins & Farmer, 2008). Espin et al.’s (2012) results fit well with those 889 
obtained by Herrmann et al. (2008), showing a negative correlation 890 
between the expression of antisocial punishment and GDP per capita.  891 
The notion that individuals’ economic decisions in one game are 892 
relatively stable and that they can be predictive of the decisions in 893 
another game has been challenged by Herrmann and Orzen (2008). 894 
Individuals classified as pro-social (altruists and conditional cooperators) 895 
in a prisoner’s dilemma problem, when presented with a contest game, 896 
invested more aggressively than individuals classified as selfish.24 897 
Moreover, individuals who played the contest game before, instead of 898 
after, the prisoner’s dilemma problem showed a decrease in cooperative 899 
behavior. Herrmann and Orzen’s results suggest that different game 900 
contexts may shift individual social preferences; a “pro-social” type may 901 
behave cooperatively in games framed as cooperative. When the game is 902 
framed as competitive, their preference may reverse. The reduction in 903 
cooperative behavior, after participation in a contest game, indicates that 904 
                                                
24 In the prisoner’s dilemma problem, an individual who defects while their 
partner cooperates receives the highest payoff. The second highest payoff is when both 
partners cooperate. A lower payoff is obtained when both partners defect. The lowest 
payoff, the so called “sucker’s payoff”, is obtained by a person who cooperates while 
their partner defects. 
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the exposure to competitive situations and environments may 905 
considerably affect the behavior of otherwise pro-social types25. 906 
When the possibility of punishment exists, social learners use it 907 
and can achieve high levels of cooperation. Ones and Putterman (2007) 908 
examined punishment behavior of individuals who were (unknowingly) 909 
grouped according to their cooperative type26. Punishment patterns (no 910 
punishment, altruistic punishment and antisocial punishment) remained 911 
consistent across a number of rounds and were present even in the end 912 
periods in which there were no incentives to punish, in terms of absolute 913 
payoff. Antisocial punishers grouped together continued to punish 914 
antisocially even in the final periods. Ones and Putterman’s (2007) 915 
results provide another piece of evidence indicating that the preferences 916 
people hold cannot be narrowed down to absolute payoff maximization.  917 
Importantly, they also suggest that antisocial punishment is not 918 
                                                
25 Note that this does not necessarily undermine the idea of individuals having 
stable strategies, rather it may mean the strategies are more complex than uniform pro- 
or antisocial behavior. 
26 The cooperative type was determined on the basis of five diagnostic rounds 
of PGG with punishment. After each round participants were reshuffeled between 
groups in a way to make the groups as diverse with respect to PGG contributions and 
punishment as possible. Next, participants were ranked according to their average 
contribution and punishment level in the five diagnostic rounds. 
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necessarily strategic and it may sometimes constitute a persistent 919 
individual strategy. 920 
Gächter and Thöni (2005) used a one-shot PGG in order to 921 
determine participants’ cooperative preferences. Participants who 922 
contributed similar amounts of money in this diagnostic round were then 923 
grouped together and showed the previous contributions of other group 924 
members27. Hence, unlike in Ones and Putterman’s (2007) design, 925 
participants knew they would be interacting with like-minded people.  926 
In the unsorted control condition the level of contributions in the 927 
diagnostic one-shot PGG round differed considerably from the first 928 
contribution round in the series of PGGs. This suggests that the prospect 929 
of repeated interaction with people with similar strategies positively 930 
affects behavior of all participants, including otherwise selfish 931 
individuals. In the unsorted control condition, most punishment was 932 
meted out by the lowest and the middle contributors but not by the 933 
highest contributors. Participants from groups with the lowest 934 
contributors meted out a considerable amount of antisocial punishment. 935 
As in other studies, the type of cooperative preferences, determined 936 
                                                
27 Participants were ranked according to their contribution in the diagnostic 
round. The three top contributors formed one group, the next three highest the second 
group etc. For analysis, three classes of groups were created with the third of groups 
with the highest contributions, the third with the middle contributions and the third with 
the lowest contributions. 
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through the diagnostic round, remained consistent and affected 937 
punishment decisions. When participants knew that they were interacting 938 
with others of similar preferences, punishment by high and medium 939 
contributors almost disappeared (probably because both groups behaved 940 
in a very cooperative way) and the only punishing group were the lowest 941 
contributors. The information about whether antisocial punishment 942 
occurred in these sorted groups of low contributors is not provided. 943 
As indicated above, motivations for antisocial punishment vary 944 
and do not necessarily involve revenge. At the most basic level, any 945 
instance of antisocial punishment is an expression of aggressive behavior 946 
(see Sylwester et al., submitted). Aggression may be used to undermine 947 
someone else’s cooperative strategy or to defend one’s own strategy. It 948 
may also result in gaining social status. In our view, costly antisocial 949 
punishment functions as a social signal to observers in the same way that 950 
altruistic acts do (Barclay, 2006; Hardy & van Vugt, 2006). By using 951 
antisocial punishment, individuals build a reputation for aggressiveness, 952 
which is likely to benefit them in some social contexts. It should be noted 953 
that while punishers may increase their payoff relative to the individual 954 
they punish, the cost of punishment means that they could also reduce 955 
their own payoff relative to that of non-punishing and unpunished 956 
individuals. By design, punishment is a costly game to play.  957 
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Antisocial punishment as an evolutionary strategy 958 
When making evolutionary inferences based on behavioral 959 
economics experiments, it is important to take into account limitations 960 
and external validity of these experiments. Humans evolved in social 961 
groups where direct and indirect reciprocity played a role and it is likely 962 
that punishers could have been easily identified. Combining costly 963 
punishment with reputation can completely change the predicted 964 
evolutionary outcomes of different strategies (Santos, Rankin, & 965 
Wedekind, 2011). Contemporary large group size, anonymity and market 966 
integration may create circumstances resembling those present in 967 
behavioral economics experiments (e.g. online interactions). However, 968 
one needs to be cautious when extrapolating the results of such 969 
experiments to an evolutionary scale. In modern human societies, status 970 
is intrinsically related to cooperative reputation (Hardy & Van Vugt, 971 
2006). When reputational information is public, as it was during the 972 
human evolutionary past, highly cooperative reputation facilitates the 973 
acquisition of desirable partners for profitable interactions (see e.g. 974 
Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). In the anonymous or pseudo-anonymous 975 
settings, used in behavioral economics experiments, at least some 976 
proportion of people may revert to the more basic way of establishing 977 
dominance – aggression.   978 
Traulesen and colleagues (García & Traulsen, 2012; Hilbe & 979 
Traulsen, 2012) have recently used computer simulations to model the 980 
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evolutionary dynamics of reputation combined with sanctioning. They 981 
found that adding individual reputation into the simulation selected 982 
against all sanctioning, except that meted out to free riders (termed 983 
altruistic here).  This may explain the difference between in-group and 984 
out-group behavior reported in the previous section – in-group 985 
individuals are, almost by definition, better known to group members 986 
than out-group ones. Therefore, the use of antisocial punishment may 987 
well vary between these conditions due to the availability of reputational 988 
information. It is worth noting, that the above models do not account for 989 
reputation gained from antisocial punishment. One can well imagine that 990 
an individual would adjust their behavior knowing that their partner tends 991 
to punish cooperators. Likewise, an uncooperative individual with a 992 
reputation for antisocial punishment might not receive much punishment 993 
from altruistic punishers because of a increased probability of retaliation. 994 
It is possible that the high levels of antisocial punishment 995 
observed in some subject pools represent a sensible strategy under 996 
anonymous conditions. However, punishment that benefits the group can 997 
be viewed as a second order public good and can, therefore, improve 998 
reputation in non-anonymous settings. It has been shown that the 999 
presence of an audience enhances the use of third-party costly 1000 
punishment against norm violators, even if that audience consists solely 1001 
of the experimenter (Kurzban, DeScioli, & O’Brien, 2007). Investing in 1002 
costly punishment that benefits the group is analogous to investing in 1003 
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cooperation, and may positively affect reputation. Indeed, people who 1004 
punish altruistically gain social benefits and higher earnings in paired 1005 
interactions, thanks to their reputations as punishers (Barclay, 2006). 1006 
Considering this strategic use of altruistic punishment, the high rates of 1007 
antisocial punishment observed in several subject pools of Herrmann et 1008 
al. (2008), may be manifested quite rarely in real life because of the 1009 
reputational advantages of punishing free-riders. The small number of 1010 
studies on reputation and punishment, and a lack of cross-cultural 1011 
comparison of the effects of reputation, make prediction of the 1012 
relationship between them difficult. In places with norms of low civic 1013 
cooperation and weak rule of law, reputational benefits from altruistic 1014 
punishment might not outweigh the benefits of the dominant status 1015 
acquired by low contributions and antisocial punishment. 1016 
Evolutionary models show that even a small proportion of 1017 
individuals with a particular strategy can have a dramatic effect on 1018 
population dynamics. A simple example would be a small number of 1019 
defectors who can invade a group of cooperators and make them 1020 
disappear from the population (Maynard Smith, 1964, 1974). In a 1021 
population where individuals use many different behavioral strategies, 1022 
evolution may promote optimal mixes so that the local economic 1023 
substrates are maximally exploited (MacLean, Fuentes-Hernandez, 1024 
Greig, Hurst, & Gudelj, 2010; Nettle, 2006). Recently, agent-based 1025 
modeling has been used to examine the consequences of adding 1026 
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antisocial punishment to the repertoire of behaviors available to 1027 
individuals in a society. In a simple model, the introduction of antisocial 1028 
punishers led to the collapse of cooperation, and punishing antisocially 1029 
became the dominant strategy (Rand, Armao, Joseph, Nakamaru, & 1030 
Ohtsuki, 2010). In a population lacking a spatial structure costly 1031 
punishment was evolutionarily stable. Punishers who could use both 1032 
altruistic and antisocial punishment achieved the highest relative payoffs 1033 
and eventually displaced non-punishers and punishers who specialized in 1034 
one type of punishment. In a spatially structured population, defectors 1035 
who did not punish and defectors who punished antisocially did best. In 1036 
this case, antisocial punishment was a powerful strategy only rarely 1037 
invaded by non-punishing defectors. In further models exploring the 1038 
impact of group-structured populations due to Powers, Taylor and 1039 
Bryson (2012) this result was showed to hold even in conditions of 1040 
between-group competition. More generally, introducing antisocial 1041 
punishment decreased the probability of the evolution of cooperation, 1042 
though where group-level selection was sufficiently powerful (groups 1043 
were small and persistent) cooperation could still evolve. Power et al.’s 1044 
(2012) results indicate that antisocial punishment can only have evolved 1045 
if it is inextricably associated with some other adaptive advantage, such 1046 
as social dominance (see also Rand & Nowak, 2011). The evolutionary 1047 
models summarised above lead to the conclusion that most of the 1048 
mechanisms that have been proposed for the evolution of altruistic 1049 
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punishment can also promote antisocial punishment, if such strategies are 1050 
not a priori excluded from the models.  1051 
Costly punishment is usually modeled within the framework of 1052 
the tragedy of the commons – despite initial cooperation, eventually all 1053 
individuals become selfish payoff maximizers in repeated PGGs. 1054 
However, many human interactions are likely to resemble not a tragedy 1055 
of the commons but a tragedy of the commune (see Doebeli & Hauert, 1056 
2005). Tragedy of the commune refers to a situation when the payoffs of 1057 
cooperation and free-riding are based on the Snowdrift Game payoff 1058 
matrix. In this game, mutual defection results in the worst possible payoff 1059 
for both partners. An individual who defects in response to their partner’s 1060 
cooperation achieves the best possible payoff. In the tragedy of the 1061 
commune cooperative types may co-exist with free-riders and 1062 
cooperation can be maintained at a stable but low level (Doebeli & 1063 
Hauert, 2005). Low but stable cooperation level was found by Herrmann 1064 
et al. (2008) in subject pools with high antisocial punishment. If the 1065 
payoff matrices of social dilemmas are more relaxed in real life than is 1066 
assumed by a standard PGG, a mix of different cooperative types may be 1067 
evolutionarily stable and therefore individuals might not be willing to use 1068 
altruistic punishment to enforce cooperative norms.  1069 
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2. Conclusions 1070 
In this article, we have examined the psychological and 1071 
ecological causes of antisocial punishment at the individual, group, 1072 
cultural and evolutionary levels. The experimental subjects typically used 1073 
to investigate costly punishment in behavioral economics were originally 1074 
heavily biased towards participants from democratic and relatively 1075 
affluent places (Henrich et al., 2010). This has resulted in antisocial 1076 
punishment being historically regarded as the “ugly step-sister” to 1077 
altruistic punishment and treated as a rare phenomenon, not deserving of 1078 
scientific attention. Thanks to the seminal study by Herrmann et al. 1079 
(2008), we now know that, although rare in some contexts, in other 1080 
contexts antisocial punishment constitutes a behavior as widely 1081 
expressed as altruistic punishment. We have proposed that the contexts 1082 
where antisocial punishment is pervasive may be the ones in which being 1083 
locally competitive is likely to provide a considerable improvement in 1084 
the socio-economic condition of the individual. In these contexts, 1085 
cooperation remains stable, but it is at a lower level, relative to other 1086 
regions. This is, possibly, because a small but stable proportion of 1087 
individuals exhibit a preference for aggressive competition.  Antisocial 1088 
punishment is also more prevalent between individuals who do not 1089 
consider each other “in-group”.  We have presented two explanations for 1090 
this: both between-group competition, and selection against antisocial 1091 
punishment in contexts where reputational cost is involved.  Antisocial 1092 
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punishment therefore does not have to be viewed as an exceptionally 1093 
complex or perplexing behavior. Rather, it can be easily described as 1094 
aggression driven by competition (Sylwester, Mitchell &Bryson, 1095 
submitted).  1096 
As Darwin (1871) aptly put it, humans normally show extensive 1097 
cooperation but in some circumstances their “lower, though at the 1098 
moment, stronger impulses or desires” (p.104) may prevail. Recent 1099 
reports concerning antisocial punishment have often emphasized the 1100 
“dark side” of human nature, indicating such behavior is purely 1101 
destructive. However, when viewed from an ecological perspective, 1102 
punishing cooperators may be just one way to gain an advantage over 1103 
others and may constitute a selfish behavior that positively affects 1104 
individual survival and well-being. Costly punishment – whether 1105 
altruistic or not – can be seen as a second-order public good because it 1106 
may improve group cooperation and payoffs (Yamagishi, 1986). It can 1107 
also be viewed as an effective weapon when used in individual 1108 
competition. 1109 
In addition to disputing that antisocial punishment is irrational, 1110 
we have also disputed the hypothesis that costly punishment reliably acts 1111 
as an independent mechanism for enhancing cooperation (Fehr & 1112 
Gächter, 2002). Rather, when the opportunity to build reputation exists, 1113 
punishment should be treated as a derivative of direct and indirect 1114 
reciprocity. As Dreber et al. (2008) suggest, “costly punishment might 1115 
EXPLAINING ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT  
 
 
 
56 
have evolved for reasons other than promoting cooperation, such as 1116 
coercing individuals into submission and establishing dominance 1117 
hierarchies” (p.350). Antisocial punishment is one example of such a 1118 
mechanism. 1119 
We have shown that antisocial punishment, although initially 1120 
costly to the punisher, may bring benefits in the long term (see Fig. 1). 1121 
The circumstances favoring antisocial punishment are defined by the 1122 
groups and cultures within which individuals are embedded. The 1123 
evidence indicates that, at a micro-level, antisocial punishment often 1124 
takes the form of negative reciprocity and may be a direct response to 1125 
other individuals’ behavior or that it is an expression of a competitive 1126 
preference. Is homo homini lupus? Yes, if the ecological and cultural 1127 
pressures make competitive behavior a successful strategy. However, 1128 
with omnipresent reputation-based mechanisms of cooperation, which 1129 
are not accounted for by behavioral economics experiments, such 1130 
pressures are likely to be counteracted in ordinary real world interactions.1131 
  1132 
1133 
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Figure 1 Antisocial punishment at individual, group and cultural level 1414 
with its possible benefits  1415 
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Table 1 1417 
P4’s behavior is a classical example of altruistic punishment. A cooperative individual 1418 
P4 suffers a cost to punish P2 who contributed less than the group average. As a result 1419 
of this punishment, P2’s contribution increases in the next PGG round.  Consider the 1420 
behavior of P1 who punished P2. As a result of the punishment, P2 increased their 1421 
contributions. Therefore, P1’s punishment can be called functionally altruistic. At the 1422 
same time, this punishment would be defined as antisocial (sensu Herrmann et al., 1423 
2008) because P1’s original contribution, which is lower than P2’s contribution, is 1424 
treated as a reference level. 1425 
Different Consequences of Costly Punishment in the PGG 
 Stage P1 P2 P3 P4 
Round 1 
PGG contribution  2 4 10 20 
Punishment decision P2 - P1 P2 
Round 2 PGG contribution  4 6 10 18 
